These are the after-campaign comments by some of the e-mail players. As a rule, they were requested to write their comments before that the bulk of data concerning the campaign was published: this limited the hindsight effect.
(David's after-action comments and reports are divided in 3 parts: El Gringo's memoirs, the final report to the Corps Commander, and a final message to his division)
1. Missed Opportunities,
From The Memoirs of El Gringo
Looking back over all these years again to the first week of March 1937 I can say with confidence that the Republics victory in the Spanish Civil War can be directly attributed to success of the El Gringo Division in the San Miguel Valley.
Some have suggested that the Nationalists were not completely defeated.. they advance the argument that the Nationalist gains west of Roncal had detrimental effects on the Madrid rail line.
This is obviously incorrect.. the Nationalists managed to advance their lines 3 km in this area but failed to hold either Castilo or Hill 1201, lacking either of these high points their was no way that they could direct accurate fire against the railway line. The argument that Nationalist light guns were now in range of the rail line is meaningless.. so such guns could now fire.. they lacked the weight of shell to damage the rail-lines and lacked the ammunition to continually fire on the rail line in hopes of hitting a passing train. A final nail to these claims is that these Nationalist guns would not have survived long.. they would have been firing from open positions under the observation of and counter-battery fire by 2 medium and one heavy Republican artillery Groups.
Had the Nationalist held either Castillo or Hill 1201 then these arguments might have validity.. but they did not and this is one of the missed opportunities of this campaign.
The Nationalists missed three other opportunities:
1/ Failure to exploit North East from Campobueno.. at one stage all that stood between the Fascists and the El Gringo Divisional HQ was the Garibaldi Battalion!
2/ Failure to effectively cut Brigada Movils North - South Lines of Communication (LOC).. various attempts were made in battalion strength, each of these were repulsed by Republican reserves rushed to that point, indeed the last was thrown back by the combat group of the 17th Construction Battalion who had all the while been building a by pass road that ran south of Yerbajo.. which brings up the issue of did the Nationalist suspect the existance of this by-pass (an idea of Comrade Commander El Campesino)? Consideration of Nationalist actions at this time would indicate that they did not! A significant failure in their reconnaissance and intelligence service.
3/ Failure to gain the initiative or concentrate in significant strength.. after their early gains around Campobueno it appears that they were reacting to the El Gringo division rather than trying to gain the iniative.. a serious failure.
This is not to say that the Republicans did not Missed Opportunities, indeed we missed three..
1/ A Coup de Force capture of Santa Julia on the first day of March by the motor-mechanised component of Brigada Movil. Such a coup would have seriously degraded the enemies LOC and focus his attention south. While hind sight is perfect.. at the time the disposition of enemy forces were not know and the diversion of the Divisions follow-on brigade (the XIIth) to contain the enemies advance towards Villanueva meant that only the Brigada's Movils Tank Bn(-) with Desenti Infantry could have reached Santa Julia.. and a night engagement by unsupported armoured troops in a town while unsupplied could have been disasterous.. the Risk was not worth it.
2/ Failure to occupy Bejares.. this is not quite correct.. Bejares was occupied at various times, for a considerable period by the recon plt of the 48th Mixed Bde and for a short period by the Esquera battalion. Rather the failure was again on the side of caution.. the Esquera Battalion was ordered to raid Bejares.. they did so..only to find it unoccupied, the fault then lay in their orders which originated in my HQ.. after the losses suffered by the 70th Bde in trying to hold Fuentes I did not intend the same for the Esquera and so they were ordered back into reserve. A seriously missed opportunity to cut the enemy LOC .
3/ postponment of the Divisional Cavalry Squadrons raid that lead to it's cancellation. Had it not been postponed then it was to penentrate the Nationalist front lines on hill 0801, hold up the day in the forest before pushing deeper into the enemies rear where it would have been employed to cut communications, attack convoys and HQs and harrass artillery units.. Carried out with daring these actions would have tied down the best part of 2 nationalist battalions. The postponement was to allow the full night of the 2nd for a deep penentration.. but the nationalists attack forstalled that and the squadron was mauled in the subsequent battle while supporting the Teruel Bn.
Given Hindsight the battle would have been different.. but it wasn't the fascists were defeated and Spain has been a republic ever since.
Viva the Republic!
Comrade Commander (ret) El Gringo
(Aka David Makin)
All the best
David Makin
2. Final report
From: Divisional Commander El Gringo
To: Corps Commander
Security: For Your Eyes Only (FYEO)
(note: now unclassified)
Comrade,
I am pleased to report that the El Gringo division has successfully completed it's mission and is now poised for further operations on your orders, below is a list of potential employment for my Division.
But First, as per your request, here follows the confidential (FYEO) report on my divisions Brigade officers and their units.
Brigada Movil:
After an initial slowness at Bde HQ this Brigade showed considerable initiative and commitment. It is all that it should be.
Suggestion:
This Brigade has the potential to be a "Shock" brigade that will cause great constentation amonst the enemy... see below for suggested TO&E.
Commander El Campesino:
El Campesino is a strong willed individual, who with more experience might make an outstanding commander, his performance is sure to be note-worthy, but... he needs either a tight rein or a free hand.. his Brigades staff work is very focussed on operations with less consideration of logistics than desired. He is a dedicated communist, indeed his zeal is such that while politically commendable is militarily a cause of friction with those less dedicated.
Suggestions:
Assign a competant pragmatic commissar to his personnel staff to act as a buffer and restraining hand.
Assign a Staff Officer of strong will and logistic capability in place of his present one, this will allow El Campesino to do what he is good at while ensuring that he doesn't fail.
70th Mixed Brigade:
A solid formation, not wanting in courage or resolve, while politcally "independant" it is sufficently anti-fascist that it can be counted on so long as it is *seen* to be supported and valued.
Suggestion:
Do not employ the 70th Bde and El Campesino in close proximity.
Comandante Grajiano:
This officer is capable and very much concerned for his mens welfare. As a result of this he will do his utmost so long as the mission is valid. He will err on caution unless convinced on the vitality of a mission.
Suggestion:
Do not subordinate him to an officer who is likely to be wasteful of his men, keep him well informed of his Bdes part in the divisions plan and you will get the most from him. Due to his political views he should not be considered for higher command.
48th Mixed Brigade:
A good solid dependable brigade, now seriously depleted, it will need to be rested and rebuilt.
Suggestion:
A positive personnel message from you to this Brigade will have a significant effect on morale, especially since they held the best part of a brigade of the Fascists finest long enough to be re-inforced. such recognition will be of immense value both military and politicly.
Comrade Castro:
A solid dependable officer, he would be very suitable (Militarily and Politically) for promotion (he acted as divisional commander in my absence), his handling of his brigades reconnaissance assets was faultless. I would suggest a staff posting with reasonable lattitude for independant command. He would make a far more effective Inteligence officer than the present holder of that office in our corps (who missed the concentration of Fascist forces in the San Miguel valley).
XIIth International Brigade:
An outstanding Brigade, only handicapped by not being Spanish! The number of different languages present pose a problem in cross attachments.
Suggestion:
Probably best to always use this brigade intact so that internal liason capabilities are maintained.
Commander Luckács:
The actions of the last few days have offered little opportunity to observe the ability of this officer, his defence has been solid, though unimaginative. I cannot say if he could have done better in a more fluid situation, he did not seem to use his reconnaissance elements, but this might have been through lack of opportunity rather than lack of ability.
Supporting units:
All have done very well, I can find no fault in them, except the shortage in artillery ammunition on the second day.
Suggestion:
The brevet Commander of the "Cuatro Naciones" Bn should be promoted to full Battalion command, he has shown himself to be a dedicated hard working and intelligent officer.
The Commander of the 17th Construction Bns Combat Group should be offered a position in command of an Infantry Bn if he wishes.
The air support has been exemplary if scarce.
3. Final address to El Gringo Division and attachments.
By Comrade Divisional Commander El Gringo.
Comrades!
I am PROUD of YOU!
The ARMY is PROUD of YOU!
The NATION is PROUD of YOU!
By your valiant efforts the Fascists in Madrid have been starved of supplies and reinforcements to such an extent that our Comrades will mop them up in a few days!
WHO amongst you can we laurel for this VICTORY?
Rifleman Ultimo Tiro who fought on after his last bullet was spent?
Artillerist Duro Alcañon who stayed at his gun though all around him fell?
Signaller Jorge Bueno Nadador who swam a river twice under fire to deliver his messages?
Pasionaria Carmela Todapimienta who proved as valiant as any man twice her size?
Exploder Alonso Todoloco who's dedication cost him his life?
Constructor Pedro Albañil who downed shovel to take rifle against the Fascists and throw them from their San Miguel lodgement?
Motorist Juan Notengo Licencia who drove his tank into the enemy guns to cover his fellows advance?
Aviator José Notengo Paracaídas who refused to leave his burning plane so that it would be repairable to fight again?
Supplist Manuel Muycansado who moved mountains to ensure that the bullets and bread reached you?
No... it is not enough! many did as much! Others who did more without any to notice!
THEN Which BATTALION can we laurel for this VICTORY?
"Lenin" who never failed to succeed?
"Royo y Negro" who held Fuentes for so long?
"Leones Rojos" - No pasaran! ?
"Andre Marty" who would not give up?
No... it is not enough! For what could be said of one could be said of many!
Then Which BRIGADE can we laurel for this VICTORY?
The "XIIth Internationalists" who came from around the world
to stand mano a mano with the fascists and throw them back from Castillo!?
The "48th Mixed Brigade" who like true Spanish Steel would not break under pressure.. ever ready to spring back with a vengeance!?
The "70th Mixed Brigade" ever willing to do what must be done, and like a ram would only give ground so to come on stronger!?
The "Brigada Movil" to whom fell the opportunity for fame and glory and who took it with both hands and held!?
No... it is not enough! There can be only one answer:
It is to EACH and EVERY one of YOU that the Laurels for this GREAT VICTORY goes!
Viva!
Viva!
Viva!
El Gringo
See El Gringo's Mission Proposal for his Division
Bob Mackenzie (Mobile Shock Brigade CO)
Dear Michele
Firstly thanks for running an excellent campaign, it was a great pleasure to participate in. Despite commanding what I suspect was the most powerful force in the game; especially as it received reinforcements during the game; the Republican Brigada Movil, I never once felt safe in my position. The "fog of war" was at times a real concern, leading to several calculated risks, the attack on Santa Julia being a prime example. if the bridge at 0207 was not blown as planned my entire flank could have been ripped assunder.
Although the fight was hard the Nationalist really lost the game when they failed to defend the east strongly enough in at the start of the game, once the Riacho was breached there was no viable defence between there and the main road. Once the main road was gained then it was easy to defend the two crossings Rio Blanco south of the Riacho. Although the nationalists finally committed significant forces in the last day of the game which kept me out of Santa Julia. They never had a chance of pushing east over the one remaining bridge. Mind you their agressive use of pontoon bridges did cause a couple of tense moments.
My favourite achivement, accruing enough experience points for the Passionara battalion to go from Green to Experienced over the course of the game. My initial orders were only to "blood" this unit, well I supose after 50% casualties its well blooded.
The campaign rules worked well, the supply rules were simple and comprehendable and DIDN'T require any book keeping which is excellent.
One minor niggle. Fire did not interdict supply which was a bit odd and seems illogical. Several of my early actions were dictated by my belief that fire should and would interdict supply. Still this didn't mar my enjoyment of the game.
Bob Mackenzie
AKA El Campesino "the peasant"
Danny O'Hara (XII International Brigade CO)
Michele,
Many thanks for the campaign. Excellent work. I look forward to seeing the "big picture" on the scw-list archives...
Please find General Luckács' final comments, below.
Cheers,
Danny O'Hara
From: XII International Brigade HQ, Villanueva
To: All elements of the XII IB
!Comrades!
The Eternal Republic has gained a victory in the name of the Spanish Proleteriat! The Fascist stranglehold on Madrid has been broken, and this is down to the efforts of this Division.
All of you performed your duties with exemplary courage and skill. The Italians of "Garibaldi" were typically fiery and resolute, and I was glad to serve with them again - even if only for part of this battle. The French and Belgians of "André Marty" proved themselves to be professional and brave - and, in particular, their commander was always ready to query my orders if he felt them to be too risky. I found it reassuring to know that one of the (potentially) toughest defensive positions was in their hands. As for the Poles of "Dombrowski", I was impressed by their stoic defence of the positions given to them. Uncomplaining, they bore many assaults. My staff, and the "Gramsci" field-gun battery, also performed well, though out of the firing line. We were well served by the support troops, whose duties seldom attract praise!
With the re-assignment of "Garibaldi", we gained new elements. The "British" battalion was particularly impressive, always cheerful in attack and defence, and skilled in all such matters. They provided an inspiration to us all. The soldiers of "Teruel" had already proven themselves in the battle when they came under my command, and despite the frequent relocations and digging in on rain-swept hills, they always followed out my orders - and even offered to improve on them. Gallant sons of the Republic, and a credit to their nation. However, in this essay of praise I must offer an apology - to the "Prieto" Youth Battalion, who were used as the Brigade reserve for most of the battle, and saw no real action. I have no complaint at their actions, and wish them to know that they did provide a vital service (even if the Fascists never actually attacked them!). Your day will come, Children of Spain! The Medium Artillery Group was also supremely professional, and it was with horror that I read the reports of their ordeal under fire upon the exposed hillside of Castillo. To all of you, I express the gratitude of the Popular Army and the Spanish Republic.
On the battle itself, I can speak only of a part of this with any certainty - the assaults on Castillo and Campobueno, and the defence of Castillo against the Fascist counter-attack. The initial assault was successful, although slowed by weather conditions and enemy actions.
Together with the 48 MB, we took Castillo with few casualties. However, the subsequent night assault on Campobueno was a serious mistake. Two of my battalions were rendered hors-de-combat (the "British" and "André Marty"), and the 122mm Artillery Group left in an exposed position. The troops rallied well, and no-one broke, so Castillo was held against Fascist counter-attack. I feel that an early-morning assault on Campobueno, with artillery and air support, would have been more successful, though casualties would probably been heavy.
I commend General "El Gringo" on his handling of the battle, despite my "hindsight" comments above, and hope to serve with him again.
!Death to the Fascist Counter-Revolutionaries!
General Luckács (CO, XII IB)
Jaime de Miguel (48th Mixed Brigade CO)
48th Mixed Brigade Commander report to Army Corps HQ.
It's been a hard and bloody fight for the 48th MB. The original btns. belonging to the unit suffered 60% casualties during the first hours, absorving the main initial attack of the fascists. The first line forces drop to small companies and detachments digging hard under the bombs and harassing fiercely the enemy.
Rebels were held in a corridor up to Castillo line, where following orders this point was defended alongside with our international comrades from the XII Brigade.
All Btns. fought well but special mentions are to be given to some of them for their effort and sacrifice (Teruel, Garibaldi, Leones Rojos...), as well as to our artillery which supported us with accuracy and efficiency. Morale is being kept very high, but strong reorganization, new reinforcements to cover casualties and some rest would be highly appreciated.
This commander will not issue an opinion or comments of his own activities as divisional commander during the battle, which are to be analyzed by the Army Corp HQ, assigning the future command duties considered as proper and adequate by that High Command
Comandante Castro
Player's opinion.
I really enjoyed my first e.mail campaign. Being sometimes critical with the CDIII level of troops involvement (I own a thousand figures, but never can use more than 100 in a single game playing usually with very equilibrated forces), I realized that larger amounts of forces can participate, letting players increase pressure in one part of the map while defending in others. A good change from my average small tactical games.
The campaign mood was excellent. Great tips from the ref. and the players (specially when using spanish names!). Also it let us to have some role-playing developing the political characters which were so important during the SCW.
I must confess that I eagerly opened my e.mail everyday to read the flash reports, studying the situation on the map and chatted with other local wargame pals about it (first cuban advisors to Castro). I deeply entered into the role of Castro, knowing that my men were in trouble and feeling that sometimes they were sent to butchery ( even asked once the General Division to let my "command stand" to go with my men for a final combat), note that Castro probably was the only commander who was injured -ok, ok, just lightly-during the battle.
Best time was when I was awarded for a short while with the Division command, giving me a full picture of the campaign, although I had to release some of my previous men and ask for new commands after the Gringo's return from his Checa's vacation. Fell in love with the Garibaldi's, and following a free interpretation of received orders, they recovered Castillo position (with great cooperation from Danny O'Hara). Almost suffered seeing all the Garibaldi's stands with a 2Hit on them meanwhile they were waiting for the italian tankettes counterattack.
I feel so enthusiast about the campaign result that I'd like to initiate another one after summertime if there's enough people interested within Madrid Dragon Club and those of you out there!
Jaime
Graziano Blanda (70th Mixed Brigade CO)
The campaign was a good idea and you carried it out very well, but I can't say I enjoyed it very much after the initial turns because my brigade had a rather passive role. This was due to the fact that I had all Regular troops, and I was ordered to attack with them, always a very tough duty as we know. During the first turn my brigade ran into the Veteran enemy units' attack, and it was a miracle if it wasn't completely wiped out. The Spartacus was virtually lost then.
After that, my units fought hard for Fuentes, and still had a foothold there, when a small reinforcement would have sufficed to pry open the enemy lines there. At that time, the deplorable behaviour of El Campesino wasted all our efforts.
You'll remember I was going to get a good, Experienced battalion, the Esquerra. Even if that player will deny this, I'm sure he simply stole the battalion that night! And, excuse me, I doubt that you, as a referee, should have allowed him. The name of the liaison officer is a tell-tale: Major Mengañó (Me engañó, he fooled me).
When I finally got control of the Esquerra, my other units had been pushed back to Cobo, and we never moved from there. The night raid by the Esquerra was basically fruitless. By then, my troops had become Experienced, but we had had serious losses and we were in no shape to attack.
A small satisfaction is that in the last turn we managed to destroy the enemy bridgehead across San Miguel. El Campesino will get all the merit for this victory, but we kept his supply lines open for him!
The e-mail players:
Our divisional commander led us to victory and certainly was an imaginative leader. I must say he often seemed to forget the low quality of my troops, and from time to time he asked me more than we could realistically expect from them. Yet I assume you need to run risks if you want to win, and we did. Certainly he did not consider us as expendable, as I was afraid he might do since we were the anarchists; he never gave me "suicidally" orders or the like. Unfortunately, as a divisional CO he failed to support me in the Esquerra affair. You already know what I think about El Campesino as to that affair... as a military commander he's probably very good, but let's not forget he got an all-Veteran unit and a tank battalion. Some of his comments about my brigade were particularly pointless if you consider the difference in ratings. The commander of the 48th MB seemed a good, competent leader, now that I know he's Spanish I suppose he knew the matter much more than me; he also sounded as an experienced player. I had no particular contacts with the remaining e-mail player.
My battalion players:
I can't comment on the Spartacus CO because that battalion was soon detached. Both the Tierra y Libertad and the Rojo y Negro COs seemed determined, reliable and disciplined players, of course I assume they were hindered by the quality of their troops. The former was especially concerned with his men's welfare and survival (and/or his unit's battleworthyness). The Carabineros CO was unreliable, slow to obey, ready to criticize, and uncooperative. I don't know if this was roleplaying; since you had warned me he would dislike obeying an anarchist and be unreliable, I assume you chose a player whose style of play would fit this bill, right? Anyway he was the worst I had. The Esquerra CO was the best. Of course he also had good troops, but he was one notch above the others because he had initiative and ideas. I don't know if the artillery and the temporary formations attached to my command to contain the San Miguel bridgehead had their own players commanding them. If they had, I have no complaints; on the contrary, they performed well. A special thanks to the commander of the construction workers who took the bridgehead.
Thank you for running this campaign.
Nationalist "De Rivera" Division Divisional commander: General De Rivera
Highest commendation and 1st level of bravery award to the italian air force. Their performance was excellent, will recomend that Spanish pilots be sent to Italy for training.
The head of intelligence has been sent to our colonies, their failure to bring home the whole map, in the end cost us the victory.
Even though we did not achieve our objectives, we tied up a main part of the Red army and alot of their elite units, inflicting a material victory on tanks and aircraft they can not afford to replace.
Indeed, we ned help from our allies in finding a balance to their T26 tanks, which had a major impact on the outcome of the battle.
2 Brigada
Brigade commander: General Tella
The elite of the army, but the most disappointing, if they had acheived their objectives on the first day, we would have won the battle, also I fail to understand their failure to hold Santa Julia effectively.
Regimiento de Infanteria "Valladolid"
Up against it from the start - did their job bravely and effectively - 2nd class award.
Columna Lopez Cardoso
Column commander: Colonel Lopez Cardoso
Again a valiant performance, I wish the general was in charge of the 2nd brigade, promotion and 2nd class award.
VI Legione Camicie Nere
Legion commander: Colonel Pittau
Again a valiant performance -, a recomended promotion to the Italian high command and 1st class award from the Spanish people.
Andrew Tiffany ("Valladolid" Infantry Regiment CO)
From the diary of CO, Valladolid Infantry Regt:
Well, the fighting is over, at least for now. We got well and truly hammered. Still don't know what happened in other parts of the operation, the information generally dried up in the face of the campaigning pressures. All I know is the other units involved failed in their drive to the north, while we got smashed and outflanked in the south.
As far as my battalions went, I think the boys proved themselves very well in the face of almost insurmountable odds. After the 2nd battalion got hammered on day one with the enemy drive in the east, they still maintained their determination to hurt the enemy at every opportunity, and this prevented, in my opinion, a full breakout by the Reds. It is just such a waste that there are now only about 50 men left fit out of that whole battalion. The good die young, it seems....
The other battalions faced a fair amount of pressure too, but in general they withstood it and were able to keep the enemy at bay, except in circumstances when even the best troops would have failed. The fact that many of the boys were not much more than that, boys, is a tribute to their belief in our cause and their faith in our Regiment. For troops without much (or any) combat experience, they have done a fine job to stop the Anti-Fascists from advancing any further than they did.
Cheers
Andrew Tiffany
Terry Tolhurst (Column Lopez Cardoso CO)
Michele,
This is my final report as Lopez Cardoso in the form of a situation report to Corp Level staff.
I think I have covered all the major points of my involvement.
I hope that my battalion players were as happy with me as I was with them. I certainly felt that they followed my orders, and reacted to tabletop situations in the proper manner. At no time did I feel that they should have done things better.
Finally, I should admit that I have never played CD before, or seen a game being played. My experience in this era is a couple of 'WRG 1925-1950' games, and 2 games of Ian Kay's "Que!" My hope was that a general knowledge of what needs to happen is all that I needed, and a well-written set of rules should cover the rest. Artillery and supply were 2 areas that caught me out, but I think I muddled it through. I might even go and get a copy of the rules myself.
Thanks to everyone who put in the effort both playing and GMing, and congratulations Michele on smoothly running an exiting and fun campaign,
Regards,
Terry Tolhurst
(AKA Lopez Cardoso)
To: Corp Commander
Column Lopez Cardoso
Situation Report.
March 3, 18.00
I can no longer contact Division HQ, so I am sending my report direct to you.
After 3 days of fighting, it seems the reds have bypassed our position around Fuentes and San Miguel and cut the highway to our rear. Most probably, the Brigades to our flanks have suffered heavy losses, resulting in our offensive to the Madrid rail link being postponed.
The column's 3 battalions are still basically intact, although losses have been suffered, and the attached Corp and Divisional artillery are in good working order.
Unfortunately, as we have to draw supply from Division HQ, having no column supply units of our own, (and with Division HQ forced to relocate away from us) has meant we have now run out of food and artillery ammunition. As such, I am relocating the column and artillery nearer to Corp Head-Quarters.
For your information, here is a brief rundown of my column's activities over the past three days.
March 1
We moved into San Miguel, in preparation to move forward through Fuentes and Bejares and then further north to cut the red railway. Almost immediately, we met retreating Nationalist forces.
The Republicans had obviously started their attack. The commander of the Requete 'Dios y Patria' Tercio seized the initiative, and although attacked by aircraft, retook Fuentes. A red counter attack later gained part of the town back, but at heavy cost.
Through breaks in the rain, tanks were spotted on the eastern side of the Rio Blanco, moving on Yerbajo. Column artillery engaged whenever visibility allowed. The 2nd Sevilla Battalion attacked across the Rio Blanco, and cleared the reds from the farmhouses, and located more enemy around Yerbajo.
As night fell, the Requetes felt they could clear Fuentes with a night attack. I passed this request to General De Rivera, who agreed.
Additionally, the 2nd Sevilla and the 'Avila' Falange Bandera were ordered to attack the enemy in the woods to the south of Yerbajo, and hold the bridge over the Riacho, all under cover of night.
Strong enemy resistance was met, and as a result, and partly due to night confusion, no gains were made in Fuentes, or the woods south of Yerbajo. We did secure the northern side of the Riacho bridge, and met the 3rd Valladolid securing the southern side. We dug in and prepared for enemy counter attacks at dawn.
March 2.
The 'Avila' Falange was ordered to reposition and defend San Miguel, and conducted this in an orderly manner, even though attacked by tanks. They proceeded to shoot up any reds that ventured too close, and as such, gave the impression that San Miguel was heavily defended.
As the morning mist cleared, the 2nd Sevilla found that it faced 2 enemy battalions, supported by tanks. Although heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy, the northern end of the bridge was taken. Some of the 2nd Sevilla returned to San Miguel, while the other survivors moved to the southern side of the bridge.
An enemy battalion managed to dig in between Fuentes and San Miguel overnight, but after not moving all morning, they were attacked and routed by artillery fire in the early afternoon. Meanwhile, the Requetes, ably assisted by a Civil Guard unit and the 1st Valdenpenas, cleared Fuentes of the red scum. The Valdenpenas boys showed tremendous skill with the bayonet, and impressed the Requete veterans greatly!
I am aware that there is now some move to disband Falange units, but I feel that the 'Avila' Falange has earned the right to be maintained as an entity.
On this afternoon, with Italian and artillery support, they attacked enemy that had infiltrated to our rear. In the face of machine gun fire, they were involved in hand-to-hand combat, and assisted the 3rd Valladolid Battalion in capturing enemy artillery. By nightfall, they had cornered a veteran red battalion in the farm in 0206.
All units dug in for the night, and it seemed there was more enemy to our rear than in front of us. I requested for crews to man our captured guns, and made moves to reorganise the 2nd Sevilla Battalion, which was guarding the footbridge erected from 0508 to 0509.
March 3.
Previously, General De Rivera had attached to my command the Corp Field Artillery Group, the Corp Heavy Artillery Group, the Division 2nd Artillery Group and the Division Medium Artillery Group. All these artillery units kept the enemy under fire, and dislodged the unit in the farm at 0206.
As the day progressed, it became quite obvious that Santa Julia had come under heavy attack. We started to reform the 2nd Sevilla with stragglers.
By midday, it was clear that Division HQ had moved south and our supply line had been cut.
With night now upon us, the Column is about to move south, to a position to thwart any further red gains. With an improvement in weather, our artillery should be able to see and deal with the red tanks, if they try to pursue.
I would like to take this opportunity to recommend the commanders of the 2nd Sevilla Infantry Battalion, the 'Dios Y Patria' Requete Tercio and the 'Avila' Falange Bandera for honourable mention in dispatches, or greater reward as you see fit. Each commander has exploited the situation to inflict heavy losses on the red filth, and has greatly furthered the Nationalist cause.
I am sure that this setback will only be temporary, and the godless reds will fail in their attempt to ruin the greater glory of Spain.
Your loyal servant,
Colonel Lopez Cardoso.
Martin Rapier (VI Blackshirt Legion CO)
(Extract from the memoirs of General Pittau, 'An Italian in Russia' pub. 1958).
....In 1937 I was assigned to command of the VIth Blackshirt Legion and sent to assist the anti-communist Spaniards in their crusade against Bolshevism. One particularly heavy period of fighting remains in my mind, the fighting in the Bianco valley in March 1937.
The troops of the Legion were enthusiastic but poorly trained, our main strength being the battalion of 75m field guns attached to the group. I was determined to engage and defeat the enemy by fire and manouver, rather than direct assault, as I suspected my command might suffer somewhat rapid attrition otherwise.
The Legion was pushed up the main road to San Miguel where it dug in for all round defence, the guns sighted for direct fire. My men distinguished themselves gloriously repelling assaults from the Reds, even driving off enemy heavy tanks with gunfire. The battle was clearly not going well when enemy units were spotted to the south (ie along our lines of communications), and throughout the fighting so far, there was virtually no sight of nor communication from, our Spanish allies.
One Cohort launched a limited attack to clear our communications, but no sooner was progress being made, than we were odered north in haste to Castillo, where the attack was held up by stubborn resistance.
I was a little surprised at this, given the threat to our rear and repeated Red assaults across from Bianco from the east, however clearly the need was greater in the north.... The field guns were set up in range of the main enemy rail line, but two of my brave cohorts suffered heavy losses in the close quarter fighting around Castillo Hill, the promised tank support never arriving.
Whilst our forces made no further progress northwards, we held off any further enemy attacks, although clearly the offensive had not made as much progress as had been hoped. I was pleased with the performance of my men but saddened by their unnecessary losses on the blood soaked slopes of Castillo Hill. My plans to engage with fire and manouver had come to nothing, fire had worked well in defence, but the scope for manouver was minimal, as was cooperation with our allies, with the result of confusion, heavy losses and failure to attain our objective. These were deficiencies I was determined to rectify as soon as possible.....
(extract ends. The author commanded a division in 8th Italian Army in Russia and was captured in early 1943, after which he was held in a labour camp, being released back to Italy in 1955.)
Cheers
Martin.
Richard Bennett (2nd Brigade CO)
I found the campaign very enjoyable. An exciting atmosphere was produced by the flash reports and I always looked forward to checking my e-mail during the campaign. There was a strong sense of the fog of war from the way information was drip fed to players during a turn. The narrative of the reports was always of a good standard as well - laced with period prose.
I did however find it hard to get a feel for what was happeing in the larger campaign and would have valued a news letter type campaign overview mail per turn - to cover events as seen by the Nationalist side - which I feel would have been realistically avaible from radio, propaganda or word of mouth along the front line.
If I learnt any thing from the campaign it is - don't attack with out artillery support!