The Battalion was despatched from the 40th Division and placed under the orders of the G.O.C. 25th Division and was ordered to report to the G.O.C. 74th Brigade, then holding portion of the line in the vicinity of STEENWERK and reported its arrival to the G.O.C. 74th Infantry Brigade at 4.0. a.m. 11/4/18.
I was ordered to prolong the line of the Brigade on the light railway, running from the PONT de PIERRE in a S.W. direction.
The amount of frontage taken up was 900 yards.
The 14th Lancashire Fusiliers were on my Left.
The position was occupied and dug in before daylight and touch was obtained with the 40th Division on the Right.
Information was received from H.Qrs. 74th Brigade at 8.0. a.m. April/4/18 that the enemy was believed to have left the vicinity of CABARET DU SAULE.
THE BATTALION was ordered to advance in conjunction with the remainder of the 74th Brigade past the hamlet of DE SAULE and push on towards the outskirts of STEENWERCK.
Orders were issued to Companies to this effect and at 9.30 a.m. strong fighting patrols left our line on edge of railway and moved towards CABARET DU SAULE.
It at once became obvious that the hamlet was occupied, as the patrols were heavily fired on by Machine Guns.
The battalion was then ordered to attack and moved forward on a frontage of 600 yards, each company being on a one platoon frontage of 150 yards, distributed in depth, one Platoon front line, one platoon support, and one platoon reserve, each company having a definite section of the village to attack. Distribution of Companies :-
Left to Right - “A” ; “B” ; “C” ; “D” Coys.
A & D Coys. were ordered to move off first and endeavour to work round the flanks of the village; B & C Coys. to attack frontally 20 minutes later.
The attacks progressed satisfactorily in spite of severe casualties, and at 11-0 a.m. the whole of the hamlet was in our hands, and our troops were on the line of road ROSSIGNOL - PONT DE PIERRE (A 16 c CENTRAL to A 16 a 9 : 6).
The enemy suffered heavily and 4 M.Guns were captured two of these being turned on the enemy by Lieut.W.G.Lapham who was with “C” Company.
About this time the regiment on our left appeared to be held up and “A” Coy. which had pushed furthest forward found itself unsupported on that flank and ceased to make progress. All the officers of this company had become casualties, so 2/Lt.Revill from “B” Coy. was ordered to go over and take over command; this he did and with great energy and determination restored the situation and continued to advance and succeeded in clearing several houses and barns, although the enemy was putting up a strong resistance.
Meanwhile on the right the attack was also proceeding satisfactorily
and was inflicting heavy loss.
The enemy attempted several local Counter Attacks, all of which were repulsed by Rifle and Lewis Gun fire.
O.C. “D” Coy. then finding that his flank was becoming exposed and that the enemy was working round, was obliged to form a defensive flank back to the line of the railway and establish touch with the elements of the 40th Division on our right. This effectively prevented this flank from gaining further ground.
12-0 noon. At this time the battalion on my left was forced to give ground and was pushed back to the line of the railway, thereby exposing my left flank. I immediately formed a defensive flank on the line of the CABARET DU SAULE - BAILLEUL ROAD by moving up the supporting platoon of “B” Company.
This situation then remained unchanged until about 4-30 p.m. when it was found that touch had been lost on the left with the 11th L.F. and on the right with the 40th Division. This was reported to Brigade H.Q. and troops were withdrawn to their original line. The whole of the above operation was carried out under very heavy and accurate M.G. and rifle fire which increased as the day wore on. After the battalion had returned to line of light railway it was found that the 40th Division had lost touch and that the enemy had obtained a lodgement in the cutting at the Right of our position and was enfilading the position inflicting casualties. Attempts were made to dislodge him, but were unsuccessful, his fire however was kept down by active sniping and L.G. fire.
The position remained substantially the same until night fall when enemy activity died down and a quiet night followed.
The Battalion was dug in as deep as possible during the night. By night-fall the battalion had 17 officer casualties and a proportionate number of Other Ranks.
The officers remaining being myself, Adjutant, L.G.Officer, and one Company officer."